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RULES OF ATTRIBUTION 
 
In the early development of English Company Law it was doubted 
whether a company could be deemed to have the necessary “malice or 
motive” for most criminal and many tortious liabilities.1 This view was 
rejected by the Privy Council in Citizens’ Life Assurance Co Ltd v Brown,2 
which led to the concept of a company having attributed to it personally (as 
against vicariously) the thoughts and actions of its “directing mind and will”. 
This was famously explained in a further House of Lords decision, Lennard’s 
Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd.3 
In the cases that followed, it became very unclear exactly who might be 
held to be the “directing mind and will” of a company, beyond any controlling 
directors. In Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass, Lord Reid said: 
 
“Normally the board of directors, the managing director and perhaps 
other superior officers of a company carry out the functions of 
management and speak and act as the company. Their subordinates do 
not. They carry out orders from above and it can make no difference 
that they are given some measure of discretion. But the board of 
directors may delegate some part of their functions of management 
giving to their delegate full discretion to act independently of 
instructions from them. I see no difficulty in holding that they have 
thereby put such a delegate in their place, so that within the scope of 
the delegation he can act as the company.” 4 
 
∗ MA (Cantab), FCSI, Barrister of Middle Temple, currently Acting Vice-Chancellor, 
University of Buckingham. 
1 Abrath v North Eastern Ply Co (1886) App Cas 247 (HL) 271 (Lord Bramwell). 
2 [1904] AC 423 (PC). 
3 [1915] AC 705 (HL) 713 (Viscount Haldane). 
4 [1972] AC 154 (HL) 171. 
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On the facts of the case, however, the actions of the store manager were 
held not to be those of the company and so Tesco was able to claim the 
benefit of a statutory defence that the local mispricing of goods was the act of 
another under section 24(1) of the Trade Descriptions Act 1968. 
In the Privy Council decision in Meridian Global Funds Management 
Asia Ltd v Securities Commission,5 Lord Hoffmann reviewed the existing 
cases again. He felt that the terminology of the “directing mind and will” 
could be misleading and the explanation as to which individual’s thoughts and 
actions were or were not to be attributed to the company lay more with 
interpreting the purpose of the law being applied: 
 
“The company’s primary rules of attribution together with the general 
principles of agency, vicarious liability and so forth are usually 
sufficient to enable one to determine its rights and obligations. In 
exceptional cases, however, they will not provide an answer. This will 
be the case when a rule of law, either expressly or by implication, 
excludes attribution on the basis of the general principles of agency or 
vicarious liability… This is generally true of rules of the criminal law, 
which ordinarily impose liability only for the actus reus and mens rea 
of the defendant himself. How is such a rule to be applied to a 
company? 
 
One possibility is that the court may come to the conclusion that the 
rule was not intended to apply to companies at all; for example, a law 
which created an offence for which the only penalty was community 
service. Another possibility is that the court might interpret the law as 
meaning that it could apply to a company only on the basis of its 
primary rules of attribution, ie if the act giving rise to liability was 
specifically authorised by a resolution of the board or an unanimous 
agreement of the shareholders. But there will be many cases in which 
neither of these solutions is satisfactory; in which the court considers 
that the law was intended to apply to companies and that, although it 
excludes ordinary vicarious liability, insistence on the primary rules of 
attribution would in practice defeat that intention. In such a case, the 
court must fashion a special rule of attribution for the particular 
substantive rule. This is always a matter of interpretation: given that it 
was intended to apply to a company, how was it intended to apply? 
Whose act (or knowledge, or state of mind) was for this purpose 
intended to count as the act etc of the company? One finds the answer 
to this question by applying the usual canons of interpretation, taking 
5 [1995] 2 AC 500 (PC). 
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into account the language of the rule (if it is a statute) and its content 
and policy.”6 
 
Applying this approach, the Lord Hoffmann held that the failure of the 
investment manager of the Company was to be attributed to the Company as 
its failure to declare a shareholding as required by section 20 of the New 
Zealand Securities Amendment Act 1988. 
Whatever the exact basis for these “special rules of attribution”, the 
personal as against vicarious nature of the company’s liability does mean that 
the company can in effect be deemed to be a co-conspirator with a director or 
other individual whose improper thoughts and/or actions have been attributed 
to it. This raises a difficult issue with which the courts have struggled for 
more than a century. It is clear that a company, and behind it, its shareholders 
and creditors, can be as much a victim as a perpetrator of a fraud or other 
wrong committed by its directors and/or other “directing mind and will”. So, 
in what circumstances should the courts recognise this and not attribute the 
fraud or other wrong to the company? 
 
HAMPSHIRE LAND  
 
The complex history of cases dealing with this issue starts with two cases 
which were not stated to be based on the attribution or non-attribution of the 
thoughts and actions of a “directing mind and will” at all. 
In Re Hampshire Land Co7 the articles of Hampshire Land (the Company) 
restricted the ability of the Company to borrow unless authorised by its 
shareholders in general meeting. At a shareholders’ meeting for which 
insufficient notice (both as to time and content) had been given, the 
shareholders purported to authorise the Company to borrow £30,000 from the 
Portsea Island Building Society (the Society). 
Mr Wills was the Company Secretary of both the Company and the 
Society and knew that the notice for the shareholders’ meeting of the 
Company was not valid. At that time, third parties (like the Society) dealing 
with a company were deemed to have constructive knowledge of any 
restrictions in the company’s articles filed at Companies House; but if there 
were procedures to overcome such restrictions, the rule in Royal British Bank 
v Turquand8 allowed the third party to presume that the procedures had been 
followed. The problem for the Society was that if the knowledge of its 
Company Secretary was attributed to it, that would defeat the presumption 
6 Ibid 507. 
7 [1896] 2 Ch 743 (Ch). 
8 (1856) 6 El & Bl 327 (Exch). 
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and the Society would be prevented from proving for its debt in the 
liquidation of the Company. 
Justice Vaughan Williams did not accept that knowledge of a common 
officer had to be attributed to both his principals9 and on the particular facts in 
Hampshire Land commented: 
 
“… if Wills had been guilty of a fraud, the personal knowledge of 
Wills of the fraud that had [been] committed upon the company would 
not have been knowledge of the society of the facts constituting that 
fraud; because common sense at once leads one to the conclusion that 
it would be impossible to infer that the duty, either of giving or 
receiving notice, will be fulfilled where the common agent is himself 
guilty of fraud. It seems to me that if you assume here that Mr Wills 
was guilty of irregularity – a breach of duty in respect of these 
transactions – the same inference is to be drawn as if he had been 
guilty of fraud.”10 
 
The problem with this rationale is that it is potentially incredibly wide. 
Virtually all improper thoughts and actions to be attributed to a company will 
have involved an agent in at least a breach of a duty of loyalty in not passing 
on his knowledge. Of course, Hampshire Land was only a first instance 
judgment and pre-dated Lennards, but Vaughan William’s rationale was taken 
up by the House of Lords in the later case of JC Houghton & Co v Nothard, 
Lowe & Wills.11  
There were two rival fruit trading companies, George Wills & Sons Ltd 
(Wills) and Nothard & Lowe Fruit & Preserving Co (Preserving). The 
companies agreed to combine their businesses under a new company, 
Nothard, Lowe & Wills (New Co). However, certain types of business 
continued to be reserved to Preserving. Maurice and George Lowe were 
directors of Preserving and New Co and Walker and Brand were directors of 
Wills and New Co.  
The Lowes negotiated a written brokerage agreement with the appellant, 
JC Houghton & Co (the Broker), whereby in return for an exclusive agency, 
the Broker advanced £20,000 to Preserving. The Broker was then entitled to 
retain and apply 70% of the net proceeds of sale of Preserving’s goods to 
repay the £20,000. Preserving, the Lowes and another also undertook in the 
agreement, that the Broker “shall be entitled to retain and apply in or towards 
repayment of the said advances, [70%] of the net proceeds of the sale of 
9 Citing Re Marseilles Extension Railway Company, Ex p Credit Foncier and 
Mobilier of England (1871-72) LR 7 Ch 161 (CA). 
10 Hampshire Land (n 7) 749. 
11 [1928] AC 1 (HL). 
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goods sold by [the Broker] on behalf of or as agents for [New Co].” New Co 
was found not to be a party to this agreement. 
As directors of New Co, Walker and Brand knew nothing of the advances 
which were applied solely to the benefit of Preserving, nor of the apparent 
agreement that 70% of the net proceeds of the sale of New Co’s goods were to 
be applied to repaying the advances. The Broker’s claim was that the Lowes’ 
knowledge of the agreement must be attributed to New Co which would then 
be estopped by conduct amounting to acquiescence from denying the 
advances and retention arrangements. Viscount Dunedin, giving the leading 
judgment, said: 
 
“The knowledge of the company can only be the knowledge of 
persons who are entitled to represent the company. It may be assumed 
that the knowledge of directors is in ordinary circumstances the 
knowledge of the company. The knowledge of a mere official like the 
secretary would only be the knowledge of the company if the thing of 
which knowledge is predicated was a thing within the ordinary 
domain of the secretary’s duties. But what if the knowledge of the 
director is the knowledge of a director who is himself particeps 
criminis, that is, if the knowledge of an infringement of the right of 
the company is only brought home to the man who himself was the 
artificer of such infringement? Common sense suggests the answer, 
but authority is not wanting.”12 
 
Viscount Dunedin then cited as precedents Hampshire Land and an earlier 
case Lacey v Hill13 to hold that the Lowes’ knowledge should not be attributed 
and so New Co had not knowingly acquiesced to the advances and retention 
arrangements. 
What is the common but perhaps unusual factor in these two cases was 
that it only required the normal attribution of an agent’s knowledge to his 
principal14 to have led to the company’s civil liability to a third party. Mere 
knowledge would have defeated the protection of the rule in Turquand in 
Hampshire Land and created an estoppel in JC Houghton. Limiting English 
law’s rather easy attribution of an agent’s knowledge to his principal in this 
way may seem acceptable. However, the refusal to attribute knowledge using 
the Hampshire Land rationale, has been applied in other circumstances. 
 
 
12 Ibid 14. 
13 (1876) 4 Ch D 537 (CA). 
14 As against the personal attribution of dishonest, intentional or reckless thoughts and 
actions. 
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TOWARDS THE PRIMARY VICTIM PRINCIPLE 
 
In Belmont Finance Corp Ltd v Williams Furniture Ltd15 the Company 
sued two of its directors because they had caused the company inter alia to 
acquire shares in another company at a grossly inflated price. At first instance, 
the Company lost on the argument that the wrongs of the two directors were 
attributed to the company since the transactions had been approved at a full 
board meeting. However, that was overturned on appeal. As Lord Justice 
Buckley said: 
 
“… [the plaintiff] was a victim of the conspiracy. I think it would be 
irrational to treat the directors, who were allegedly parties to the 
conspiracy, notionally as having transmitted this knowledge to the 
[plaintiff]; and indeed it is a well-recognised exception from the 
general rule that a principal is affected by notice received by his agent 
that, if the agent is acting in fraud of his principal and the matter of 
which he has notice is relevant to the fraud, that knowledge is not to 
be imputed to the principal.”16 
 
Although not cited in Belmont, this view is clearly based on Hampshire 
Land. This victim concept was taken up and extended in Attorney-General’s 
Reference (No 2 of 1982).17 Controlling director-shareholders of the Company 
were charged with stealing from the Company. It was argued that as the 
knowledge and dishonest intent of such controllers had to have been attributed 
to the Company, the Company must logically have consented to the 
appropriations. This was rejected by the Court of Appeal. Lord Justice Kerr 
cited the passage from Belmont above and said: 
 
“So far as the authorities in the realm of the civil law are concerned, 
this decision directly contradicts the basis of the defendants' argument 
in the present case. There can be no reason, in our view, why the 
position in the criminal law should be any different.”18 
 
A further extension of the victim concept was attempted in first 
McNicholas Construction Co Ltd v Customs and Excise Commissioners19 and 
15 [1979] Ch 250 (CA). 
16 Ibid 261. 
17 [1984] QB 624 (CA). 
18 Ibid 641. 
19 [2000] STC 553 (QB). 
 219 
                                                     
CASE COMMENTARY 
then Morris v Bank of India.20 In McNicholas site managers of the Company 
created paperwork indicating payments to bogus sub-contractors in order to 
recover VAT that had never been paid. This apparently made the company 
liable to pay compensation to the VAT man and the Company argued that the 
fraudulent behaviour of its site managers should not be attributed to the 
Company as, although the fraud was primarily aimed at the VAT man, this 
risk to the Company made it a secondary victim. As Justice Dyson said: 
 
“The Hampshire Land principle or exception is founded in common 
sense and justice. It is obvious good sense and justice that the act of an 
employee should not be attributed to the employer company if, in 
truth, the act is directed at, and harmful to, the interests of the 
company. In the present case, the fraud was not aimed at [the 
company]. It was not intended by the participants in the fraud that the 
interests of [the company] should be harmed by their conduct. In 
judging whether the fraud was in fact harmful to the interests of [the 
company], one should not be too ready to find such harm.”21 
 
The same argument was adopted by the Court of Appeal in Morris v Bank 
of India. The London manager of the Bank of India, Mr Samant, had involved 
the Bank in a scheme that had as its aim fraudulently to deprive the creditors 
of another bank, Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), of their 
rights. This involvement in the scheme exposed the Bank of India to claims 
from BCCI of fraudulent trading under section 213 of the Insolvency Act 
1986. In rejecting the application of the Re Hampshire Land principle, Lord 
Justice Mummery said: 
 
“Clearly there are some circumstances in which an individual’s 
knowledge of fraud cannot and should not be attributed to a company. 
The classic case is where the company is itself the target of an agent’s 
or employee’s dishonesty. In general, it would not be sensible or 
realistic to attribute knowledge to the company concerned, if the 
attribution had the effect of defeating the right of the company to 
recover from [the] dishonest agent or employee or from a third party. 
[Counsel] argued that there should be no attribution of knowledge as 
this was a case in which [the Bank of India] was the ‘secondary 
victim’ of Mr Samant. His actions were harmful to the interests of [the 
Bank of India], as he had exposed it to the risk of potential liability for 
fraudulent trading. We have no hesitation in rejecting [this] 
20 Aka Re Bank of Credit and Commercial International SA (No 15) [2005] EWCA 
Civ 693; [2005] 2 BCLC 328.  
21 McNicholas (n 19) [55], [56]. 
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submission. If it were correct, it would never be possible to attribute 
the knowledge of the individual to a company under section 213.”22 
 
This last point highlighted the dangerously wide potential of the 
Hampshire Land rational and the development of the primary victim principle 
was clearly an attempt to restrict its application. Of course, it is hard to 
classify the Society in Hampshire Land as a primary victim, but the non-
attribution of knowledge of a company’s constitution to a bona fide third 
parties is now dealt with by section 40 of the Companies Act 2006.23 The 
Society would almost certainly be treated as bona fide now because section 
40(2)(b) specifically says: 
 
“A person dealing with a company... 
(iii) is not to be regarded as acting in bad faith by reason only of his 
knowing that an act is beyond the powers of the directors under the 
company’s constitution.” 
 
As for JC Houghton, although not characterised in this way by the House 
of Lords, the Lowe brothers’ attempts to divert New Co’s resources to pay 
Preserving’s debts did make New Co look like a primary victim.  
So, to this point, the case history suggested that, at least in cases requiring 
more than the attribution of knowledge under general agency principles, the 
courts would only attribute dishonesty, intent etc where special rules of 
attribution applied (usually involving a “directing mind and will”). However, 
such attribution would not be made where the company was the “primary 
victim”.  
This whole area has now been reconsidered by the Court of Appeal in 
Bilta (UK) Ltd v Nazir.24 
 
REJECTING HAMPSHIRE LAND 
 
In Bilta, Mr Nazir and Mr Chopra were the Company’s only directors and 
Mr Chopra the sole shareholder. The company bought and sold European 
Emissions Trading Scheme Allowances (EUAs) which at the time were 
VATable. However, the two directors arranged transactions with other 
corporate defendants apparently to ensure that the Company never had 
sufficient funds to pay the VAT as it became due (known as a carousel fraud). 
22 Morris (n 20) [114]. 
23 Section 40 has been held to cover procedural matters formerly subject to the rule in 
Turquand (n 8), see Smith v Henniker-Major and Co [2002] EWCA Civ 762; [2003] 
Ch 182. 
24 [2013] EWCA Civ 968; [2014] Ch 52. 
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So from the very start of trading, the Company was insolvent and now its 
liquidator was seeking damages and equitable compensation from the 
directors and these other corporate defendants, allegedly all involved in this 
conspiracy. In this hearing in front of the Court of Appeal, the corporate 
defendants were seeking to strike out the action against them on the grounds 
that the only victim of the alleged conspiracy was the VAT man and the 
Company was a perpetrator of the fraud because the conduct of the directors 
and sole shareholder had to be attributed to it personally. 
This argument was rejected at 1st instance and by the Court of Appeal. In 
the leading appeal judgment, Lord Justice Patten cast some doubts on both the 
Hampshire Land and primary victim rationales. He pointed out that: 
 
“[Re Hampshire Land Co] was concerned only with the imputation of 
knowledge which was relevant to Portsea’s ability to enforce a 
contract that was unauthorised by Hampshire Land. The judge treated 
it as a question of whether the knowledge of an agent should be 
imputed to his principal and it was not therefore necessary for him to 
consider any wider issues of attribution relevant to unlawful conduct. 
In particular, the rationale based on the inherent unlikelihood of the 
director disclosing his own fraud to the object of his deceit might be 
thought to apply even where the intended victim was not the company, 
of which he was a director or officer but was a third party. Yet this 
was not sufficient to prevent attribution in [El Ajou’s case] and the 
other liability cases I mentioned earlier.”25 
 
These “liability cases” were El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc,26 Royal 
Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan,27 McNicholas Construction Co Ltd v Customs 
and Excise Comrs28 and Morris v Bank of India.29 As Lord Justice Patten 
pointed out, in these cases: 
 
“… reliance on the consequences to the company of attributing to it 
the conduct of its managers or directors is not enough to prevent 
attribution because… it would prevent liability ever being imposed. 
As between the company and the defrauded third party, the former is 
not to be treated as a victim of the wrongdoing on which the third 
party sues but one of the perpetrators.”30 
25 Ibid [41]. 
26 [1994] 2 All ER 685 (CA). 
27 [1995] 2 AC 378 (PC). 
28 McNicholas (n 19). 
29 Morris (n 20). 
30 Bilta (n 24) [34]. 
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On the other hand, he thought that non-attribution could arise in secondary 
damages cases. 
 
“But it does not follow… that secondary damage of the kind relied on 
unsuccessfully in the liability cases will not be sufficient to prevent 
attribution when it forms the subject matter of the action by the 
company against those whose breach of duty has caused it. In that 
context the damage is not secondary but primary and the company is 
the direct victim of the breach of duty relied on. It ought therefore not 
to matter whether the conspiracy alleged in these proceedings had as 
its object a VAT fraud on HMRC or is limited to depriving Bilta of 
the proceeds of sale from the EUAs.”31 
 
So Lord Justice Patten took the view that in civil cases, the wrongdoings 
of a company’s agents (at least those who could be viewed as the “directing 
mind and will”) should be attributed to the company where the issue was the 
company’s liability to third parties, but not where the issue was the breach of 
duty of the agent to the company. Likewise presumably in criminal cases, 
attribution to the company would arise where it served the purpose of the 
statute in protecting third parties and the public,32 but not where it would 
prevent the purpose of protecting the company.33 
To get to the position of rejecting both the Hampshire Land and primary 
victim rationales, Lord Justice Patten was forced to re-write some the 
rationales given for previously decided cases. What, as he himself admitted, 
could still stand in the way of this approach was the 3-to-2 majority decision 
of the House of Lords in Stone & Rolls Ltd v Moore Stephens.34 
 
STONE & ROLLS 
 
As I have written elsewhere,35 this penultimate decision of the Appellate 
Committee of the House of Lords36 was not perhaps its finest hour. In Stone & 
Rolls Mr Stojevic acquired the Company to use as a vehicle for a Ponzi 
scheme based on obtaining ever larger letters of credit from banks against 
31 Ibid [45]. 
32 Meridian (n 5). 
33 Attorney-General’s Reference (n 17).  
34 [2009] UKHL 39; [2009] 1 AC 1391. 
35 Alistair Alcock, ‘Auditors’ Liability and Stone & Rolls Ltd v Moore Stephens’ in 
Gore-Browne on Companies Special Release (Jordans 2011) 6. 
36 In 2009, the judicial functions of the House of Lords were transferred to a new 
Supreme Court. 
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bogus equipment purchases. When eventually the Company defaulted, a 
Czech bank found itself owed nearly $200 million. The moneys paid to the 
Company and indeed to Mr Stojevic had disappeared. So the Company’s 
liquidator proceeded to sue the auditors of the Company, Moore Stephens, for 
failing to detect and thereby prevent the escalation of the fraud. In this 
hearing, the auditors had applied to strike out the action on the grounds that 
the Company was barred from suing by the ex turpi causa principle. The 
auditors claimed that the Company was itself a perpetrator of the fraud with 
Mr Stojevic since, as the “directing mind and will” of the Company, indeed 
probably its only shareholder, his fraudulent intent and actions had to be 
attributed to the Company. 
In Bilta, Lord Justice Patten’s analysis of the decision in Stone & Rolls 
was that two of the majority, Lords Walker and Brown, held that Hampshire 
Land (referred in Stone & Rolls as the “adverse interest” principle or rule) 
would have applied had not ownership and control vested entirely with the 
fraudster, ie a “sole actor”.37 Also, unfortunately for Lord Justice Patten’s 
analysis of the old cases, Lord Walker (with whom Lord Brown basically 
concurred) went on to say of the adverse interest principle: 
 
“I can see no reason why the principle should be limited to claims. It 
is… a general principle of agency which can apply to any issue as to a 
company’s notice, knowledge or complicity, whether that issue arises 
as a matter of claim or defence.”38 
 
Lord Justice Patten dismissed this as “true but the contexts in which the 
point arises are very different.”39 
On the sole actor exception to the adverse interest principle, Lord Walker 
looked to the US decision in Mediators Inc v Manney, Re The Mediators 
Inc.40 He explained this and the argument that the Company was only a 
secondary victim and so not entitled to the adverse interest principle thus: 
 
“It is necessary to keep well in mind why the law makes an exception 
(the adverse interest rule) for a company which is a primary victim 
(like the Belmont company, which was manipulated into buying 
Maximum at a gross overvaluation). The company is not fixed with its 
directors’ fraudulent intentions because that would be unjust to its 
innocent participators (honest directors who were deceived, and 
37 Bilta (n 24). The ‘adverse interest’ and ‘sole actor’ terminology comes from US 
cases. 
38 Stone & Rolls (n 34) [145]. 
39 Bilta (n 24) [59]. 
40 (1997) 105 F 3d 822, 827. 
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shareholders who were cheated); the guilty are presumed not to pass 
on their guilty knowledge to the innocent. But if the company is itself 
primarily (or directly) liable because of the ‘sole actor’ rule, there is 
ex hypothesi no innocent participator, and no one who does not 
already share (or must by his reckless indifference be taken as 
sharing) the guilty knowledge.”41 
 
However, Lord Justice Patten took the view that the third member of the 
majority in Stone & Rolls, Lord Phillips, came to his conclusion by a very 
different route: 
 
“Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers considered that the answer to the 
question whether the ex turpi causa rule applied to the claim was not 
to be found in the application of the Hampshire Land principle but by 
looking behind the company at the persons whose interests the duty of 
the auditors was intended to protect. Since this was owed to the 
shareholders of the company and not to its creditors, there was no 
justification for disapplying the ex turpi causa rule.”42 
 
As Lord Phillips put it himself: 
 
“I have reached the conclusion that all whose interests formed the 
subject of any duty … owed by Moore Stephens to S&R, namely the 
company’s sole will and mind and beneficial owner Mr Stojevic, were 
party to the illegal conduct that forms the basis of the company’s 
claim. In these circumstances I join with Lord Walker and Lord 
Brown in concluding that ex turpi causa provides a defence.”43 
 
Since only two of the majority relied upon any argument involving 
Hampshire Land, Lord Justice Patten also considered the two dissenting 
judgments. Lord Scott based his judgment primarily on there being no public 
policy purpose in applying the ex turpi causa rule at all.44 As for the sole actor 
exception: 
 
“It is noteworthy that there appears to be no case in which the ‘sole 
actor’ exception to the Hampshire Land … rule has been applied so as 
to bar an action brought by a company against an officer for breaches 
of duty that have caused, or contributed to, loss to the company as a 
41 Stone & Rolls (n 34) [173]. 
42 Bilta (n 24) [54]. 
43 Stone & Rolls (n 34) [86]. 
44 Ibid [120]. 
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result of the company engaging in illegal activities. I can easily accept 
that, for the purposes of an action against the company by an innocent 
third party, with no notice of any illegality or impropriety by the 
company in the conduct of its affairs, the state of mind of a ‘sole 
actor’ could and should be attributed to the company… But it does not 
follow that that attribution should take place where the action is being 
brought by the company against an officer or manager who has been 
in breach of duty to the company… Mr Stojevic could not, in my 
opinion, reduce his liability for breach of duty to S&R by attributing 
to S&R his own dishonesty, praying in aid the ‘sole actor’ exception 
and the application of the ex turpi causa rule.”45 
 
Lord Mance attacked the argument that the Company was a secondary 
victim and so could not claim the benefit of Hampshire Land, an argument 
that had persuaded the Court of Appeal to uphold the defence of ex turpi 
causa. 
 
“In distinguishing between the primary and secondary victims, the 
Court of Appeal in the present case was, however, influenced by 
reasoning in McNicholas… and [Morris v Bank of India]… Both those 
cases were… concerned with claims against the company by injured 
third parties, rather than claims by the company against others in 
breach of duty to it. So it is not clear why the Hampshire Land issue 
arose at all, and in my view the statements in them are of no assistance 
in resolving any issue of attribution in the present context.”46 
 
He also disliked importing the “sole actor” rule from the US because there 
was a fundamental difference between US and UK law:47 
 
“… an important element to understanding this rule is that in 
American law ‘Where third parties aid and abet a fiduciary’s breach of 
duty to creditors… the creditors may bring an action in their own right 
against such parties.’”48 
 
Lord Mance ultimately concluded that the “sole actor” rule was irrelevant 
because, in direct contradiction to Lord Phillips, he believed an auditor’s duty, 
45 Ibid [109], [110]. 
46 Ibid [234]. 
47 Ibid [239]. 
48 Re The Mediators Inc (1997) 105 F 3d 822, 825. 
 226 
                                                     
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
where a company was insolvent, was not just (if at all) to shareholders, but 
also (perhaps only) to creditors, like the duty of directors.49 
Clearly in Bilta, Lord Justice Patten preferred the arguments of the 
dissenting judges in Stone & Rolls, but could he avoid being bound by those 
of the majority? 
 
COULD STONE & ROLLS BE DISTINGUISHED? 
 
Unsurprisingly, the corporate defendants in Bilta put the same two 
arguments as the auditors did in Stone v Rolls, namely: 
 
1. The Company was not the primary victim – that was the VAT 
man – so non-attribution using the Hampshire Land/primary 
victim rationale(s) was not possible. The Company’s inability 
to pay the VAT was an integral part of the fraud, ie the 
Company was a primarily a perpetrator. 
2. The total control of Mr Nazir and Mr Chopra meant that the 
Company was a one-man company and so attribution fell 
within the “sole actor” exception. There were no innocent 
participators in the company prejudiced by the company’s 
inability to obtain damages or compensation. 
 
In general, Lord Justice Patten pointed out that these two arguments were 
only accepted by two out the five Lords in Stone & Rolls, Lords Walker and 
Brown. Lords Scott and Mance firmly rejected them and the “swing vote” of 
Lord Phillips was based on his view that the duty of the auditors was limited, 
ie only owed to, here entirely fraudulent, shareholders and not to creditors. So 
Lord Justice Patten concluded by asking: 
 
“But are we bound by [the] Stone & Rolls [case] to apply the sole 
actor exception in this case [Bilta] case? I do not believe we are. The 
issue on that appeal concerned a claim by the company against its 
auditors who were not party to the fraud on the bank but were 
negligent in not alerting the company to its existence. Both this court 
and the House of Lords have decided that [Re Hampshire Land Co] 
did not prevent attribution in that case. There is, however, a significant 
difference between the liability of an auditor for failing to notify the 
company about what was taking place and a conspiracy against the 
company by its directors and others to deprive it of its assets. The 
claim against the auditors was a claim against a third party who owed 
49 Liquidator of West Mercia Safetywear Ltd v Dodd & Another [1988] BCLC 250 
(CA). 
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no fiduciary duties as such to the company or its creditors based on 
what in the context of that claim was secondary damage caused to the 
company by a separate breach of duty on the part of the company’s 
own director. It is therefore readily distinguishable from what we have 
to consider. The decision in [the] Stone & Rolls [case] should be 
confined in my view to the claim and the facts in that case.” 50 
 
Again, the ever resourceful Lord Justice Patten, here came up with a 
rationale that does not appear anywhere in Stone & Rolls itself. Only one out 
of five Law Lords, Lord Phillips, suggested that the decision turned on the 
limited nature of the auditor’s duty, and then not the distinction drawn here. 
Indeed, Lord Mance thought the scope of the auditor’s duty similar to that of a 
director and there is at least one Court of Appeal decision suggesting that the 
duty might include, where there is no innocent board member/shareholder to 
report to, reporting matters to the authorities.51 However, before coming to 
any conclusions about the current state of the law in this area, two further 
Court of Appeal decisions not cited in Bilta but theoretically binding the 
court, should be considered. 
 
SAFEWAY STORES  
 
In Safeway Stores Ltd v Twigger52 the Claimant Companies admitted to 
breaching section 2(1) of the Competition Act 1998 and because it was 
accepted that the infringement had been committed “negligently or 
intentionally by the undertaking” under section 36 of the same Act, the 
Claimant Companies were subject to a penalty of between £10.5 and £16.5 
million. Now the Companies were seeking an indemnity and damages from 
the directors and managers who had involved them in the breach. These 
directors and managers raised the defence of ex turpi causa, claiming that as 
their intention was attributed personally to the Companies, they were in effect 
co-conspirators. At first instance, this argument was rejected by Justice Flaux 
because he believed that the Companies’ liability was arguably only vicarious 
and arose from the general rules of agency, unless it could be shown at full 
trial that each of the defendants was a “directing mind and will” of the 
Companies.53 
This decision was overturned by the Court of Appeal. As Lord Justice 
Longmore said: 
50 Bilta (n 24) [81]. 
51 Sasea Finance Ltd v KPMG [2000] 1 All ER 676 (CA) 684. 
52 [2010] EWCA Civ 1472; [2011] 2 All ER 841 . 
53 Safeway Stores Ltd. v Twigger [2010] EWHC 11 (Comm); [2010] 3 All ER 577  
[68], [74], [75]. 
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“… the company’s liability is not vicarious for the simple reason that 
the 1998 Act does not impose any liability of any kind on the directors 
or employees of an undertaking for which the companies can be 
vicariously responsible. The liability is a ‘personal’ one and that is 
enough to make the acts of the company ‘personal’ for the purpose of 
the application of the [ex turpis causa] maxim.”54 
 
He went on to reject the application of Hampshire Land.55 This does not 
seem to be consistent with Lord Justice Patten’s views on the scope of non-
attribution in Bilta:  
 
“… when it forms the subject matter of the action by the company 
against those whose breach of duty has caused it. In that context the 
damage is not secondary but primary and the company against those 
whose breach of duty has caused it. In that context the damage is not 
secondary but primary and the company is the direct victim of the 
breach of duty relied on.”56 
 
However, Lord Justice Pill explained why, in Safeway Stores, there might 
be a particular public policy behind rejecting the application of Hampshire 
Land to this part of the competition legislation:  
 
“The policy of the 1998 Act is to protect the public and to do so by 
imposing obligations on the undertaking specifically. The policy of 
the statute would be undermined if undertakings were able to pass on 
the liability to their employees or the employees’ D&O (directors and 
officers) insurers. Only if the undertaking itself bears the 
responsibilities and meets the consequences of their non-observance 
are the public protected… [T]he provisions of the 1998 Act may be 
contrasted with those in Part 6 of the Enterprise Act 2002 which 
created a criminal offence of dishonesty in agreeing to make identified 
anti-competitive agreements. Under that statute the offence can be 
committed only by individuals.”57 
 
It is interesting to note that in a case of primary attribution, a director 
voting at a board meeting in favour of an improper course of action by the 
54 Safeway Stores (n 52) [27]. 
55 Ibid [29]. 
56 Bilta (n 24) [45]. 
57 Safeway Stores (n 52) [44]. 
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company may not be personally liable unless his involvement in the course of 
action is more direct.58 
 
ROZEIK 
 
In R v Rozeik,59 Rozeik was appealing his conviction for dishonestly 
obtaining property (namely cheques) by deception under section 15 of the 
Theft Act 1968. He had provided two finance companies with false invoices 
for property when entering into hire purchase agreements, but there was some 
evidence that the branch managers at the two finance companies knew that the 
information was false. At first instance, however, Judge David Smith QC 
instructed the jury that “If any employee of the company was deceived by that 
invoice into doing something which resulted in a cheque being obtained, then 
the prosecution have proved the case.” 60 
Lord Justice Leggatt, giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal, 
summarised the law thus: 
 
“Whether or not a company is fixed with the knowledge acquired by 
an employee or officer will depend on the circumstances. It is 
necessary first to identify whether the individual in question has the 
requisite status and authority in relation to the particular act or 
omission in point…61 An employee who acts for the company within 
the scope of his employment will usually bind the company since he is 
the company for the purposes of the transaction in question…62 The 
company may be liable to third parties or be guilty of criminal 
offences even though that employee was acting dishonestly or against 
the interests of the company or contrary to orders. But different 
considerations apply where the company is the victim and the 
employee’s activities have caused or assisted the company to suffer 
loss. The company will not be fixed with knowledge where the 
employee or officer has been defrauding it… In such a case 
knowledge of a manager is not to be imputed to his employers if the 
manager is acting in fraud of his employers and the knowledge which 
58 MCA Records Inc v Charly Records Ltd (No. 5) [2001] EWCA Civ 1441; [2003] 1 
BCLC 93 cf Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v Princo Digital Disc GmbH [2003] 
EWHC 2588 (Pat); [2004] 2 BCLC 50. 
59 [1996] 1 WLR 159 (CA). 
60 Ibid 161. 
61 El Ajou (n 26) 696. 
62 Director General of Fair Trading v Pioneer Concrete (UK) Ltd. and Another 
[1995] 1 AC 456 (HL) 465. 
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he has is relevant to the fraud…63 The reason why the company is not 
visited with the manager’s knowledge is that the same individual 
cannot both be party to the deception and represent the company for 
the purpose of its being deceived.”64 
 
So, if it had been proved that the managers had been dishonest, in effect 
working with Rozeik, then their knowledge would not have been attributed to 
the company and the company would have been deceived and both Rozeik 
and the managers guilty under section 15. However, the managers had not 
been called as witnesses, and so without any clear evidence of their 
dishonesty, their possible knowledge could be attributed to the company and 
so there was a doubt that the company was deceived. Rozeik’s conviction was 
quashed. 
Lord Justice Leggatt’s “circumstance” based approach as to when the 
normal rules of attribution are overridden in the criminal sphere is very much 
in line with Lord Justice Patten’s “context” based approach in the civil sphere. 
 
IS HAMPSHIRE LAND DEAD? 
 
Clearly in one sense Hampshire Land is very much alive. It is remarkable 
that a 1st instance decision dating from before many of the key House of Lords 
decisions on Company Law,65 is still cited so often.66 This is so, even though 
the actual decision in the case would almost certainly now fall to be decided 
under what has become section 40 of the Companies Act 2006. Nevertheless, 
as this brief survey of some of the cases citing Hampshire Land shows, the 
original rationale given in Hampshire Land has to be doubted, at least outside 
the area where a company’s legal position is determined by the attribution or 
non-attribution of mere knowledge. Where, attribution is of dishonest, 
intentional or reckless thoughts and actions, the implausible width of the 
rationale was highlighted by Lord Justice Mummery in Morris v Bank of 
India67 and most recently by Lord Justice Patten in Bilta68 where he went on 
to say: 
 
“In particular, the rationale based on the inherent unlikelihood of the 
director disclosing his own fraud to the object of his deceit might be 
63 Attorney General’s Reference (n 17). 
64 Ibid 164. 
65 Not just Brown (n 2) and Lennard’s (n 3), but even by a few months, the House of 
Lords decision in Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (HL). 
66 30 times since 2000 in WestLaw, ie over twice a year. 
67 Morris (n 20) [114]. 
68 Bilta (n 24) [41]. 
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thought to apply even where the intended victim was not the company, 
of which he was a director or officer but was a third party.”69 
 
That has been clearly rejected with the development of the primary victim 
rule; but as Lord Justice Patten pointed out, the primary victim restriction on 
the application of the Hampshire Land rationale is not a complete explanation 
of when a company should or should not have the improper thoughts and 
actions of its agents attributed to it. Even if the company is a primary victim, 
the “liability cases” show that attribution of such thoughts and actions should 
be allowed to determine the company’s liability to third parties.70 On the other 
hand, Lord Justice Patten also believed that there should be no attribution 
even if the company is a secondary victim and the company is suing its agent 
for breach of duty. This seems to have been the position of Lord Justice 
Leggatt in Rozeik when he considered attribution and non-attribution in a 
criminal context.71 
There is at least one case where a company was clearly suing its agents as 
a secondary victim, Safeways,72 where the Court of Appeal refused to make 
an exception to attributing improper thoughts and actions to the Company. 
However, as Lord Justice Pill highlighted, the legislation was itself in an 
unusual form.73 Most legislation creating criminal or other liabilities does so 
in terms appropriate for individuals and leaves it to the courts to interpret, 
now guided by Meridian,74 whether and how it might be applied to 
companies. The Competition Act 1998 clearly makes the “undertaking” liable 
and Lord Justice Pill’s interpretation of the public policy behind that is itself 
an example of following the approach of Lord Hoffmann in Meridian. 
This leaves the House of Lords decision in Stone & Rolls.75 In Bilta, Lord 
Justice Patten ingeniously managed, in effect, to adopt the arguments of the 
two dissenting judgments in Stone & Rolls. As a matter of making sense of 
this area of law, I have enormous sympathy with Lord Justice Patten. In what 
was his final UK judgment before retirement, Lord Scott in Stone & Rolls 
ended an exemplary career as a judge interpreting Company Law, even if, as 
in that case, he sometimes failed to convince his fellow judges.76 
69 Ibid [41]. 
70 Ibid [34]. 
71 Rozeik (n 59) 164. 
72 Safeway Stores (n 52). 
73 Ibid [44]. 
74 Meridian (n 5). 
75 Stone & Rolls (n 34) 1391. 
76 For a much earlier example of when his fellow judges should have heeded Sir 
Richard Scott V-C as he then was, see his 1st instance judgment in  Equitable Life 
Assurance Society v Hyman [1999] Pens LR 297 (Ch), dismissed by the House of 
Lords with disastrous consequences at [2002] 1 AC 408 (HL). 
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Nevertheless, until the Supreme Court revisits this area, lower courts still have 
to deal with Lords Walker and Brown’s explanation of Hampshire Land and 
its limitations. Fortunately, a Supreme Court decision is imminent as 
permission to appeal Bilta to the Supreme Court was granted in February 
2014 and the hearing is set for the autumn. 
The truth is that the law has moved so far away from the original rationale 
in Hampshire Land that it is time to kill it off. Perhaps when the Supreme 
Court does consider Bilta, the one element of Lords Walker and Brown’s 
judgments in Stone & Rolls that should be adopted is to rename the rule or 
rules on non-attribution as the “adverse interest” principle and then consign 
the use of Hampshire Land to history. 
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